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This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the dis-
tinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory.
We study voting contests with a ﬁnite as well as an inﬁnite number of
voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of
the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium
outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a
larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.
The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincer-
ity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the beneﬁt of
voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we oﬀer new insights on
explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative
diﬀerent from the one declared as the most preferred.
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“Yesterday, I went to visit my neighbor, who is called Samer.
Samer is in his thirties, and he works in a supermarket [...] He
said that he likes Fattah’s party [...] but at that time, he thought
that he wanted Fattah to win in low results. So he voted
for Hamas, who used to be the second power in the Palestinians
streets.”
Quotes from Palestinians who voted for Hamas
Behind the Wall
www.lifebehindthewall.org
Arguments like Samer’s opening quote are the most visible expression of
a common fact: voters show interest for the support that each alternative re-
ceives in an election. In fact, an important part media attention, candidates’
post-election statements, and in general election analysis concentrate on the
margin of victory rather than on the identity of the winner, which in many
cases is known beforehand.
There are many explanations why voters may care about the allocation
of votes, most of them boiling down to the expectation that the share of the
vote received by the winner may inﬂuence policymaking: issues of legitimacy
to implement unpopular policies often arise for candidates elected by narrow
margins; the power of the opposition to block legislation (for example with
the ﬁlibusters in the U.S. democracy) or, in general, to control government
depends on its electoral support; parties’ choice of political positions are
often inﬂuenced by the support they received in the last election; even the
viability of that party may be aﬀected by the relative support since, in many
democracies, public funding for a party is based on the share of the vote
it received. On a diﬀerent context, it is common for committees to stress
1the support received by a chosen alternative or elected candidate as a signal
of internal agreement or disagreement with the proposed plan of action or
economic strategy.
The theoretical literature on political competition has also captured this
idea that the electoral support may aﬀect policies by specifying an insti-
tutional context like a divided government (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995),
“proportional representation” (Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın, 1997), or a generic policymak-
ing function that relates policies and vote allocation (Llavador, 2006). How-
ever, those analysis either assume that citizens vote sincerely or use an ad
hoc description of voters’ behavior. For example, Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995) imposes a conditional sincerity condition that requires that no voter
prefers “a decrease in the expected vote for the party he has voted for” (p.50).
Llavador (2006) models the beneﬁt of voting as the utility change implied by
a marginal increase in the support for the party supported with the vote.
The current paper analyzes a voting contest where individuals have pref-
erences over the distribution of votes. Although preferences over vote allo-
cations could be easily derived from preferences over policies by specifying
any of the institutional contexts mentioned above, we take preferences as
primitives of the model and impose minimal restrictions on their functional
forms to work within a more general framework.
The setting throughout the paper involves two alternatives and a set of
individuals who have single-peaked preferences over vote allocations. We
study ﬁrst electorates with a ﬁnite number of voters (which includes com-
mittee voting) and mandatory voting. Voters must vote for one of the two
alternatives and a voting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no voter
2wants to change her vote. Two observations are in order. First, the re-
striction on the number of alternatives does not conﬁne policies to a unidi-
mensional policy space. Because individuals have preferences deﬁned over
vote allocations, alternatives may represent bundles of policies or positions
in several issues. Thus, there is no restriction on the dimensionality of the
policy space. Secondly, we do not impose continuity, concavity/convexity or
symmetry conditions on preferences (see ﬁgure 1), and individuals may diﬀer
not only in their bliss point but also in the functional form of their utility.
The main result of the paper proves the existence of a unique voting equi-
librium outcome. The intuition is simple. At equilibrium, those voters who
want a larger support for one of the alternatives must support it with their
vote, imposing in this way an upper and a lower bound on the share of votes
for each alternative. We prove then that there exists a unique electoral out-
come consistent with those bounds (Theorem 1). Moreover, the equilibrium
electoral outcome is the unique ﬁxed point of the closed survival function
associated to the distribution of the electorate (see Section 3 for details and
Figure 2 for illustrations of diﬀerent equilibria). Our analysis also predicts
that some voters who favor an electorally balanced result may cast their vote
strategically for an alternative diﬀerent from the one they would declare as
their most preferred in order to compensate an excessive support for such
alternative, as it is consistently reported in election surveys.1
Next we analyze electorates with a continuum of voters by studying equi-
1For example, in the SELECTS Swiss electoral study of 2003, which is conducted after
the parliamentary election, 11% of those who reported having voted give diﬀerent answers
to the questions “which party did you vote for?” and “which is the party you feel closest
to?”. (I thank Patricia Funk for this information.)
3libria as the number of citizens tend to inﬁnity.2 Section 4 shows that only
one electoral outcome can be sustained as the limit of the equilibrium elec-
toral outcomes of a sequence of ﬁnite societies whose distributions weakly
converge to a continuous distribution F. Moreover, this electoral outcome is
the ﬁxed point of the survival function 1 − F.
Finally, we show that we can go a step further and obtain the previous re-
sults, for ﬁnite and inﬁnite electorates, even when we allow voters to abstain.
In our setting, only those who obtain their preferred outcome may abstain:
since everybody is pivotal, in the sense of inﬂuencing the electoral outcome,
and there is no cost of voting, abstention can only arise as a strategic decision
to avoid changing an electoral outcome which is optimal for the point of view
of the voter.
2 The Model
Consider a group of n individuals who have to choose between two alter-
natives A and B.3 Let S = {A,B} represent the set of strategies for each
voter with representative element si ∈ S. Thus voting is mandatory in this
section.4 A proﬁle of actions is a vector s = (s1,...,sn). Each proﬁle s
determines an electoral outcome deﬁned as the fraction of votes for each al-
2Observe that we cannot use the same approach as before, since with a continuum of
voters the action chosen by an individual does not aﬀect the electoral outcome and hence
any proﬁle of votes is a Nash equilibrium.
3As mentioned in the introduction, each alternative may represent a bundle of policies
or positions over many issues. Hence the restriction is on the number of alternatives that
voters can choose from but not on the dimensionality of the policy space.
4We introduce abstention in Section 5. Although the results with and without ab-
stention are substantially identical, we ﬁnd helpful for the exposition to separate their
presentation.
4ternative. Given that there are only two alternatives, the electoral outcome







be the set of electoral outcomes, where an ele-
ment e of En represents the fraction of the total vote cast for alternative
A, with the remaining fraction 1 − e supporting B.
Deﬁne the electoral outcome function ˜ e : S ×···×S → En such that
˜ e(s) =
|{si ∈ s : si = A}|
n
. (1)
The distinguishing feature of our approach is that individuals have pref-
erences over electoral outcomes. Let individual i’s preferences be represented
by the utility function ui : [0,1] → <. (Observe that voters may diﬀer in the
functional form of their utilities.) Assume that preferences are single-peaked.
Denote by ei = argmaxe∈En ui(e) voter i’s preferred electoral outcome among
those feasible and assume it is unique.5 As ﬁgure 1 illustrates, these are very
mild conditions that allow for a wide variety of preferences. In particular,
we want to emphasize that we do not impose any continuity, concavity or
symmetry condition on preferences.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We can identify voters by their ideal electoral outcomes. Let fn : [0,1] →
[0,1] represent the probability function of voters’ preferred electoral out-
comes. And let Fn(x) =
P
z≤x fn(z) be the corresponding discrete cumula-
tive distribution function.
5It is suﬃcient, although not necessary, for this condition to hold that voters have ideal
policies that are feasible.
5A voting equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies s∗ ∈ Sn such that no citizen
has incentive to change the current electoral outcome e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) by choosing
a diﬀerent action from her equilibrium action s∗
i. That is, we use Nash
Equilibrium in pure strategies as our concept of equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A voting equilibrium is a proﬁle of strategies s∗ ∈ Sn such
that for all i = 1,...,n
ui(˜ e(s
∗)) ≥ ui(˜ e(si,s
∗
−i)) for all si ∈ S.
3 Equilibrium results for a ﬁnite number of
voters
The main result of this section shows that a unique equilibrium electoral
outcome e∗ exists and divides the electorate such that all voters to the left
of e∗ vote for B while all voters to the right vote for A. The intuition is
simple. Voters with ideal outcome to the right of e∗ want a larger support
for alternative A, and therefore they must be voting for A at equilibrium.
Similarly, those voters whose ideal policy sits to the right of e∗ must be voting
for B, for otherwise they could shift the electoral outcome in their favor by
switching their vote.
These conditions impose upper and lower bounds on the share of votes
that alternative A may receive at equilibrium. Namely, at any indivually
consistent outcome e∗, alternative A must receive at least 1 − F(e∗) of the
votes and no more than 1 − F(e∗) + f(e∗). The following lemma shows that
6there exists one and only one electoral outcome satisfying these necessary
conditions, becoming the only possible equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 1 Let fn and Fn be the discrete PDF and CDF of a population of
n individuals. Then, the correspondence φn : [0,1] →→ [0,1] with φn(x) =
[1 − Fn(x),1 − Fn(x) + fn(x)] has a unique ﬁxed point. That is, there exists
a unique x∗ ∈ [0,1] such that x∗ ∈ [1 − Fn(x∗),1 − Fn(x∗) + fn(x∗)].
Proof:
Observe that φn : [0,1] →→ [0,1]. It follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed point
theorem that if φn is closed then it has a ﬁxed point.
Take xk → ¯ x, yk ∈ φn(xk) and yk → ¯ y. By construction of the corre-
spondence φ, we can always ﬁnd a ball B￿(¯ x) around ¯ x such that ∀x ∈
B￿(¯ x), φn(x) ⊆ φn(¯ x). Thus, for a suﬃciently large N and or all k > N,
|xk − ¯ x| < ￿ and hence φn(¯ x) ⊇ φn(xn) 3 yk. Since yk → ¯ y and yk ∈ φn(¯ x)
for all suﬃciently large k, then ¯ y ∈ φn(¯ x) and hence φn is closed. Therefore
there exists x∗ such that x∗ ∈ φn(x∗).
Finally, we prove uniqueness. Observe that the survival function 1 − Fn is
a non-increasing function satisfying that for all x0 < x, 1 − Fn(x) + fn(x) ≤
1 − Fn(x0).
Take x < x∗. Recall that x∗ ∈ φ(x∗) and hence 1 − Fn(x∗) ≤ x∗ ≤
1 − Fn(x∗) + fn(x∗). Then 1 − Fn(x) ≥ 1 − Fn(x∗) + fn(x∗) ≥ x∗ > x,
and x / ∈ φn(x) for all x < x∗.
Similarly, take x > x∗. Then, 1 − Fn(x) + fn(x) ≤ 1 − Fn(x∗) ≤ x∗ < x, and
x / ∈ φn(x) for all x > x∗.
We conclude then that φn has a unique ﬁxed point. ￿
7The previous lemma has restricted the set of possible equilibrium out-
comes to one element: e∗ such that e∗ ∈ φn(e∗). It also follows from the
reasoning above that if that outcome is an equilibrium then it acts as a di-
viding type (not related to the median), such that all voters with ei < e∗
vote for B, while all voters with ei > e∗ vote for A. It still remains to show
that such an equilibrium exists. But, since any vote is optimal for voters
obtaining their ideal outcome (ei = e∗), equilibrium existence only requires
to ﬁnd an allocation of votes s∗ satisfying the previous conditions and con-
sistent with the electoral outcome e∗. The following theorem compiles the
previous results and shows that this is the case and an equilibrium always
exists. Moreover, the equilibrium is unique up to a permutation of votes
among voters obtaining their preferred electoral outcome.
Theorem 1 Consider a n-citizen electoral game with single-peaked prefer-
ences over electoral outcomes. Then:
1. Let s∗ be a voting equilibrium and let e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) be its associated equi-
librium electoral outcome. Then s∗
i = A for all i with ei > e∗ and
s∗
i = B for all i with ei < e∗.
2. There always exists a voting equilibrium s∗ = (s∗
1,...,s∗
n).
3. The electoral equilibrium outcome is unique. Namely, e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) for all
voting equilibrium s∗.
Proof:
(1 ) Let s∗ be a voting equilibrium with k∗ voters voting for A. That is,
e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) = k∗/n. Suppose that s∗
i = A for some voter with ei < e∗. If
voter i decides to switch her vote to B she will change to electoral outcome
8to ˜ e(B,s∗









By single-peakedness of preferences, ui(˜ e(B,s∗
−i)) > ui(e∗), contradicting the
assumption that s∗ is an equilibrium.
A symmetric argument explains why no voter with ei > e∗ can be voting for
A at equilibrium.
(2 ) Let e∗ be the unique ﬁxed point of φn, as deﬁned in lemma 1. Namely,
1−F(e∗) ≤ e∗ ≤ 1−F(e∗)+f(e∗). Let s∗ such that s∗
i = A for all ei > e∗ and
s∗
i = B for all ei < e∗, and so satisfying the equilibrium necessary conditions
presented in part (1) . Let qA = n(1 − F(e∗)) and qB = n(F(e∗) − f(e∗))
represent the number of voters with ei > e∗ and ei < e∗, respectively. Then
qA ≤ n e∗ and qB ≤ n(1 − e∗).
If f(e∗) = 0, then qA + qB = n, 1 − F(e∗) = e∗, and s∗ is an equilibrium.
If f(e∗) > 0, then there exists at least one ei = e∗ and hence e∗ is feasible, that
is, there exits an integer k such that e∗ = k/n. Let kA = n e∗−qA voters with
ei = e∗ vote for A, and let s∗
i = B for the remaining kB = nf(e∗)−kA voters
with ei = e∗. Note that any strategy that yields e∗ as the electoral outcome
is optimal for voters with ei = e∗. It follows that n ˜ e(s∗) = qA + kA = n e∗,
and everybody is voting optimally. Therefore, s∗ is an equilibrium.
(3 ) Finally, uniqueness of the electoral equilibrium follows directly from
part (1) and the uniqueness of the ﬁxed point in Lemma 1. ￿
[Figure 2 about here.]
9Observe that the equilibrium outcome is graphically very appealing (see
ﬁgure 2) and easy to calculate as the unique ﬁxed point of the correspondence
φn (constructed by “closing” the survival function 1 − Fn).
More importantly, Theorem 1 oﬀers new insights on why some citizens
do not vote for their preferred alternative. Election surveys consistently re-
port a group of citizens who vote strategically for an alternative diﬀerent
from the one they declared as the most preferred.6 According to the present
model, some of those voters favor an electorally balanced result and decide
to cast their vote to compensate an excessive support for one of the alterna-
tives. Therefore, Theorem 1 oﬀers two testable hypothesis: citizens voting
for an alternative diﬀerent from their declared as most preferred should fa-
vor (relatively) balanced results and should expect too much support for the
alternative they prefer.
Finally, suppose that all voters prefer outcomes with their favored alter-
native getting all the votes, and hence, in this sense, they do not stresses the
margin of victory. In our settings, this implies that the electorate’s preferred
outcomes concentrate on 0 and 1. It follows from the previous analysis that
the electoral outcome will be e∗ = 1 − Fn(0) = fn(1). Therefore, at equi-
librium everybody votes for their declared preferred alternative. That is,
sincere voting obtains, replicating the Nash equilibrium in weakly undomi-
nated strategies of traditional voting models.
Corollary 1 Let voters’ ideal electoral outcomes concentrate on 0 and 1,
6See footnote 1. Our own anecdotical evidence also supports the existence of such
behavior. For example, during the referendum to ratify the European constitution in
Spain, some Catalan nationalist parties campaigned against ratiﬁcation, and it was argued
that their position would have changed had not been undoubtedly clear from the very
beginning that the “yes-vote” would prevail.
10that is, fn(0)+fn(1) = 1. Then s∗
i = A for all i with ei = 1, and s∗
i = B for
all i with ei = 0.
Proof:
If fn(0) = 1 or fn(0) = 0 then, since fn(0) + fn(1) = 1, all voters unani-
mously prefer that one of the alternatives receives all the votes and hence all
voters vote for this alternative at equilibrium.
If 0 < fn(0) < 1, then Fn(e) = fn(0) for all e < 1. Therefore, e∗ =
1 − Fn(e∗) = 1 − fn(0) ∈ (0,1). By Theorem 1, everybody with ei > e∗ vote
for A and everybody with ei < e∗ vote for B. But, because these voters are
concentrated on 1 and 0, respectively, they all vote sincerely. ￿
4 Continuum of voters
In this section we study equilibria in a society with a continuum of agents.
The previous analysis cannot be trivially extended to this new setting since,
with a continuum of agents, the action chosen by an individual does not
aﬀect the electoral outcome. Hence any proﬁle of strategies is an equilibrium.
We can analyze however the voting game as the number of agents tends to
inﬁnity.
Consider a sequence of discrete distributions {Fn}∞
n=1 that weakly con-
verges to a continuous distribution F as n goes to inﬁnity.7 We know from
Theorem 1 that there exists a unique equilibrium outcome e∗
n associated to
each Fn. Then we can analyze where the sequence of equilibria tends to.
7The sequence {Fn}∞
n=1 is said to weakly converge or converge pointwise to a function
F on [0,1] if the sequence {Fn(x)}∞
n=1 ∈ R converges to F(x) for each x ∈ [0,1] (Sydsæter
et al., 2005, p.86)
11The following theorem shows that it converges to the unique ﬁxed point e∗
of the continuous survival function associated to F, namely it converges to
e∗ deﬁned as e∗ = 1−F(e∗) (see Figure 3). In fact, the theorem goes further
and says that no matter how we approach the continuous CDF, the sequence
of electoral equilibria always converges to the same value e∗.
In other words, from the analysis of discrete distributions, e∗ comes out
as the natural candidate for a voting equilibrium outcome with a continuum
of voters. Take any sequence of discrete distributions that weakly converges
to F, then the sequence of electoral equilibria always converges to the same
value e∗. Thus, e∗ is the only electoral outcome that can be sustained as the
limit of equilibrium electoral outcomes of a sequence of societies with a ﬁnite
number of citizens whose distributions weakly converge to F as the number
of citizens tend to inﬁnity.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Theorem 2 Let F be a continuous distribution function. Let {Fn}∞
n=1 be a
sequence of discrete distribution functions that weakly converges to F, where
Fn represents the CDF of a population with n agents. Letting e∗
n be the
electoral equilibrium outcome associated to the distribution Fn, n = 1,2,...,
the sequence {e∗
n}∞
n=1 converges to e∗ as n goes to ∞, where e∗ is deﬁned as
the unique solution to e = 1 − F(e).
Proof:
Let F be a continuous distribution, and let e∗ = 1 − F(e∗). (Uniqueness
follows from the strict monotonicity of F.) Take a sequence of discrete CDFs
12{Fn}∞
n=1 that weakly converges to F, that is, taking e ∈ [0,1] then
∀￿ > 0 ∃Ne such that ∀ n > Ne |Fn(e) − F(e)| < ￿ (2)
From Theorem 1, there exists a unique voting equilibrium outcome e∗
n asso-
ciated to each Fn. And we want to show that the sequence of equilibrium
outcomes {e∗
n}∞
n=1 converges to e∗ as n goes to inﬁnity. That is,
∀￿ ∃N : ∀n > N |e
∗
n − e
∗| < ￿. (3)
Take ￿ > 0 and n > Ne∗ (see (2)), and consider the following three cases:
(i) Fn(e∗) = F(e∗) = 1 − e∗. It follows from the characterization of e∗
n
that e∗
n = e∗ for all n, and hence |e∗
n − e∗| = 0 < ￿.
(ii) Fn(e∗) < F(e∗) = 1 − e∗. Since Fn is a non-decreasing function,
Fn(e∗ + ￿) ≥ Fn(e∗). From weak convergence (2), Fn(e∗) > F(e∗) − ￿ =
1 − e∗ − ￿. Therefore, Fn(e∗ + ￿) > F(e∗) − ￿ = 1 − (e∗ + ￿) which, jointly
with Fn(e∗) < 1 − e∗, implies that e∗
n ∈ (e∗,e∗ + ￿) and hence |e∗
n − e∗| < ￿.
(iii) Fn(e∗) > F(e∗) = 1 − e∗. Since Fn is a non-decreasing function,
Fn(e∗ − ￿) ≤ Fn(e∗). From (2), Fn(e∗) < F(e∗) + ￿ = 1 − e∗ + ￿. Therefore,
Fn(e∗ − ￿) < 1 − (e∗ − ￿). It follows that e∗
n ∈ (e∗ − ￿,e∗), and hence
|e∗
n − e∗| < ￿.
Therefore, we have proved that (3) holds and hence that {e∗
n} → e∗ as
n → ∞. ￿
We have found that, when voting is mandatory, for any discrete or contin-
uous distribution of the electorate, there exists a unique electoral outcome
13which acts as a dividing type. This result is consistent with the intuition
behind Alesina and Rosenthal’s (1995) conditional sincerity and Llavador’s
(2006) beneﬁt of voting, providing a formal analysis explaining their model-
ing choice of voting behavior.
In the next section we show that we can go an step further and obtain
these results, with minor qualiﬁcations, even when we allow voters to abstain.
5 Abstention
This section relaxes the assumption of mandatory voting and let citizens
choose between voting for one of the two alternatives or abstaining. Formally,
we extend the set of strategies to include the possibility of abstention: S =
{A,B,O}.
Incorporating abstention allows for many more outcomes not feasible un-
der mandatory voting and requires adapting three concepts already intro-
duced: the set of feasible electoral outcome, the electoral outcome function,
and preferences over electoral outcomes.
If at least one individual votes, an electoral outcome is fully described by






represent possible outcomes when k agents vote, the set of electoral outcomes
with abstention can be constructed as En =
Sn
k=1 ˆ Ek.
Deﬁne the electoral outcome function with abstention ˜ e : S ×···×
S → En as8
8A precise deﬁnition should assign a value to the case when nobody vote. However, we
only need one voter who prefers an outcome diﬀerent from everybody abstaining to obtain
a positive turnout, in which case the analysis does not depend on the value assigned to
the option of zero votes. We assume in the analysis that such a person exists.
14˜ e(s) =
|{si ∈ s : si = A}|
|{si ∈ s : si = A}| + |{si ∈ s : si = B}|
. (4)
Finally, let citizens have preferences deﬁned over electoral outcomes and
represented by the single-peaked utility function ui : [0,1] → R. Let a voter
i have a unique preferred outcome ei among those feasible. We want to em-
phasize that we have not imposed any additional restriction over preferences
with respect to the analysis with mandatory voting.9
The following theorem shows that the results found under mandatory
voting with ﬁnite populations are replicated when we introduce abstention.
Obviously, Lemma 1 holds since it was not related in any way with the set
of strategies.
Theorem 3 Consider a n-citizen electoral game with single-peaked prefer-
ences over electoral outcomes and abstention. Then:
1. Let s∗ be a voting equilibrium and let e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) be its associated equilib-
rium electoral outcome. Then s∗
i = A for all i with ei > e∗ and s∗
i = B
for all i with ei < e∗. Hence only voters with ei = e∗ may abstain.
2. There exists a voting equilibrium s∗ = (s∗
1,...,s∗
n).
3. The electoral equilibrium outcome is unique. Namely, e∗ = ˜ e(s∗) for all
voting equilibria.
9Observe that deﬁning preferences over electoral outcomes implies assuming that voters
have no preferences over abstention levels. Alternatively, we could have assumed that
citizens hold electoral outcomes lexicographically above turnout or that everybody prefers
more participation than less. Although incorporating preferences over abstention is an
interesting avenue of research, we believe that our current description captures many real
situations.
15Proof:
The proof follows closely the same steps as the proof of Theorem 1. If e∗
n is
a voting equilibrium outcome, then everybody with ei > e∗
n must be voting
s∗
i = A since they prefer a larger support for A. Similarly, voters with ei < e∗
n
must be voting s∗
i = B. Therefore, from Lemma 1, the unique candidate for
an equilibrium outcome is e∗
n: the ﬁxed point of φn. Let kA = |{i : ei > e∗
n}|
and kB = |{ei < e∗
n}|.
If there exists q ∈ {0,1,...,n} such that e∗
n = k/n, the same voting proﬁles
described in the proof of Theorem 1 are still equilibria when we allow for
abstention.


















where q(e) = nfn(e) is the number of citizens with ei = e. But this is
a contradiction with the assumption that there does not exists an inte-
ger k such that e∗
n = k/n. Similarly, if e∗










n q(e)/n, reaching also a contradiction.
We have proved then that 1 − Fn(e∗
n) < e∗




n) > 0 and so e∗
n is feasible. Then there exist integers qA and qB
such that e∗
n = qA/(qA + qB). Deﬁne nA = qA − kA, nB = qB − kB, and
nO = n − qA − qB. Observe that:
i) nA,nB, and nO are integers less than n.
ii) nA + nB + nO = n − kA − kB = q(e∗
n). Hence letting nA voters vote for
A, nB vote for B and nO abstain, we have partition the set of voters with
ei = e∗.
16iii) The share of the vote for alternative A resulting from the previous allo-
cation of votes is
kA + nA







where we have used the deﬁnition of nA and nB. Therefore, we have found
the following equilibrium: s∗
i = A for all ei > e∗
n and nA voters with ei = e∗
n;
s∗
i = B for all ei < e∗
n and nB voters with ei = e∗
n; and the remaining nO
voters with ei = e∗
n abstain.
Finally, uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome follows from Lemma 1. ￿
Observe that only those who obtain their preferred outcome may abstain.
In our setting, everybody is pivotal in the sense of inﬂuencing the electoral
outcome and there is no cost of voting. Hence, abstention can only arise as a
strategic decision: citizens who abstain do so to avoid changing an electoral
outcome that coincides with their most preferred one.
Theorem 3 also shows that, for a ﬁnite number of agents, the equilib-
rium electoral outcome is unique and characterized as the ﬁxed point of the
connected survival function. Therefore, we can still apply Theorem 2 to the
analysis of a society with a continuum of agents with abstention. That is,
e∗ (such that e∗ = 1 − F(e∗)) is the only electoral outcome that can be
sustained as the limit of a sequence of equilibrium electoral outcomes from
societies with a ﬁnite number of citizens who may abstain and whose distri-
butions converge to F as the number of citizens tend to inﬁnity.
176 Final remarks
This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive fea-
ture that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting
contests with a ﬁnite as well as an inﬁnite number of voters, and with and
without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence of a
unique equilibrium outcome. At equilibrium voters who prefer a larger sup-
port for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. Uniqueness allow
us to easily embed our voting model into a political competition model of
divided government, proportional representation, or any other institutional
framework in which the political power of the government or the opposition
is aﬀected by the electoral support it receives. In fact, our voting model
provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the beneﬁt of voting function in Llavador
(2006).
Future work should extend the analysis to include more than two alter-
natives (which requires a multi-dimensional space of electoral outcomes) and
to introduce uncertainty on voter expectations. Given the clarity and gen-
erality of our current results, we are optimistic on the future understanding
of these questions, which may shed much needed light on voting behavior on
parliamentary elections and multiparty systems.
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(a) Voter i’s favorite outcome is B




(b) Voter i prefers any outcome
with B winning, but she’d rather





(c) Voter i wants B to win, but
she prefers A winning by a narrow
margin than B getting a too large




(d) Voter i has a preference for
close results. Anything diﬀerent
from a tie is “much” worse. Never-
theless, she also shows a preference
for B.
Figure 1: Examples of preferences over electoral outcomes for an in-
dividual who shows a preference for alternative B. As the pictures
illustrate, continuity, concavity, or symmetry conditions are not
required for the analysis. Electoral outcomes are represented by e:




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Electoral equilibria for diﬀerent distributions of a ﬁve-
voter electorate. Capital letters under the x-axis represent the
location of voters’ ideal electoral outcomes and the alternative sup-
ported with their vote in equilibrium. The equilibrium electoral
outcome, e∗
n represents the fraction of the vote for alternative A.
Voters with a lower(higher) ideal electoral outcome vote for B(A).
The correspondence φ is obtained by “closing” the survival func-
tion 1 − Fn: φn(e) = [1 − Fn(e),1 − Fn(e) + fn(e)], whose lower
and upper bounds represent the fraction of people who want at





































































































































































































































































































Figure 3: Equilibrium outcome for an electorate with a continuum
of voters. The equilibrium electoral outcome x∗ represents the
fraction of the vote for alternative A. At equilibrium, the fraction
of voters with a higher ideal electoral outcome (1 − F(x∗)) equals
the fraction of voters voting for A (i.e. x∗).
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